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MULTIFETAL PREGNANCY REDUCTION IN ASSISTED
REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES: A LICENSE TO KILL?
Siddharth Khanijou*
INTRODUCTION
Assisted reproductive technology (ART) has existed for over twenty-
five years.' During this time, the technology has allowed many couples
that suffer from infertility - generally defined as an inability to
conceive despite regular and unprotected intercourse for 1 year2 - to
experience the joys of parenthood. In 2002, the 115,392 ART cycles
reported a 40% increase from data gathered in 1998 and a 78% increase
from 1996 figures.3 Live births from reproductive technology have
risen from 20,659 in 19964 (0.5% of total live infants born) to 45,751 in
2002. This number is likely to grow as more clinics begin to offer ART
services. When combined with more recent technology, such as pre-
implantation genetic diagnosis, 5 ART increases the probability of
giving a healthy child to an infertile couple since it may prevent the
implantation of embryos that might develop into seriously impaired
children.6 Similarly, the knowledge gained through the Human Genome
* J.D. candidate 2006, DePaul University College of Law; A.B. 1999, Occidental
College. I am grateful for the guidance and encouragement provided by Professors
Michele Goodwin and Nanette Elster. Special thanks to my wife Priti for her infinite
patience, thoughtful suggestions, and medical perspective.
1 Jennifer Rosato, The Children of ART: Should the Law Protect Them from Harm?,
2004 UTAH L. REv. 57, 57 (2004).
2 Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), Assisted Reproductive
Technology: Home, available at
http://www.cdc.gov/reproductivehealth/ART/index.htm.
3 Nat'l Centers for Chronic Disease Prevention and Health Promotion (CDC), 2002
Assisted Reproductive Technology Success Rates: National Summary and Fertility
Clinic Reports (December 2004), available at
http://www.cdc.gov/reproductivehealth/ART01/PDF/ART2002.pdf.
4 B.M. Dickens, Some Ethical and Legal Issues in Assisted Reproductive Technology,
66 INT J. GYNECOL OBSTET 55, 55 (1999).
5 Technology that allows a pre-embryo to be screened for genetic disease before it is
implanted in a woman's uterus. This technique has been used to detect many
debilitated diseases including Tay-Sachs, cystic fibrosis, sickle-cell anemia, and
early-onset Alzheimer's disease. Rosato, supra note 1, at 58.6 id.
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Project promises even more screening and more healthy children born
to parents.
7
However, this positive portrayal of ART represents only half
the story and ignores a serious problem. In the last decade, there has
been a dramatic increase in multifetal pregnancies as a result of ART.
In 1980, 37 per 100,000 live births in the United States were triplet or
higher order pregnancies; by 2002, this rate had increased fivefold to
184 per 100,000.8 Data published by the Centers for Disease Control
(CDC) indicate that more than 30% of assisted technology births are
multiples compared to the 2% incidence in the general population. 9
The media and much of the public hail multiple births as a
"miracle," as in the case of the septuplets born to the McCaughey
family, but the medical community is not so enamored. They have
identified such pregnancies as failures, rather than successes, of the
IVF enterprise. The press heralded the live birth of sextuplets in
California, but the attention soon disappeared when three of the six
died." In 1998, one year after the septuplets, the birth of octuplets in
Texas made history. But this holiday "miracle" soon turned tragic when
one of the infants died and the remaining seven returned to neonatal
intensive care soon after Christmas. 12 Perhaps some records were
simply not meant to be broken.
But while the stories of multiple births have grabbed the
newspaper and magazine headlines of late, the equally provocative, but
less sensational, accounts of women who have "chosen" to undergo
multifetal pregnancy reduction (MFPR) to reduce the number of fetuses
they were carrying has gone largely unnoticed. 13 "The presence, in
previously infertile women, of more fetuses than can safely be brought
to term remains one of the ultimate ironies in medical care." 14
Multifetal reduction procedures attempt to prevent the complications of
7id.
8 Carson Strong, Too Many Twins, Triplets, Quadruplets, and So On: A Call for New
Priorities, 31 J.L. MED. & ETHICs 272, at * 1 (2003).
9 Victoria Wright, et al, CDC: Assisted Reproductive Technology Surveillance -
United States, 52(SS-9) MMWR 1 (August 29, 2003).
10 Nanette Elster, Less is More: The Risks of Multiple Births, 74(4) FERTILITY AND
STERILITY 617, 618 (2000).
" Mary Rorty, Elective Fetal Reduction: The Ultimate Elective Surgery, 13 J.
CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 53, 62 (1996).
12 Elster, supra note 10, at 617.
13 Stacey Pinchuk, A Difficult Choice in a Different Voice: + Multiple Births,
Selective Reduction and Abortion, 7 DUKE J, GENDER L. & POL'Y 29, 30 (2000).
14 Rorty, supra note 11, at 59.
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a multiple pregnancy and improve outcomes by decreasing the number
of potential live births. However, this failure of the fertility procedure
comes at the expense of patients. Couples, who previously struggled to
conceive, are now being asked to consider bringing about the death of a
fetus to save their pregnancy. The psychological effects that
accompany abortion decisions are potentially more prominent in
couples who have undergone this dramatic shift in perspective.
As scientists and humanitarians, physicians want to be able to
use the most advanced technology available to help their patients.
However, because federally funded embryonic experimentation is
prohibited, any and all risks of new techniques must be borne by the
infertile couples and their future children with, perhaps, tort litigation
as their only recourse.' 5 Yet despite the weaknesses in the current
system, assisted reproductive technology proceeds virtually
unregulated, largely because the politically charged abortion debate
prevents the creation of any meaningful policy.' Politicians need to
realize that their stalemate has led to an increase in fetal loss and the
birth of disabled children. It is time to turn our attention to this system
failure and hold the government accountable for its failure to legislate
protections for couples undergoing ART. The emotional stress and
psychological injuries suffered when forced to make ethically-charged
reduction decisions should not be the price we must pay for our civil
liberties.
This article suggests that the time has come to strictly regulate
the fertility industry. Part I discusses the different types of reproductive
technologies, risks of ART on children and parents, current regulatory
mechanisms, and options available when the fertility procedure results
in multifetal pregnancy. Part II discusses the psychological, medical,
ethical, and legal implications of multifetal pregnancy reduction and a
need to reduce the practice of pregnancy reduction. Finally, Part III
proposes regulating the implantion of embryos to reduce the occurrence
of multiple gestation, and concomitantly, the use of multifetal
pregnancy reduction.
15 Rosato, supra note 1, at 73.
16 Id, at 61; see also Parens and Knowles, Reprogenetics and Public Policy:
Reflections and Recommendations (August 2003), available at
http://www.thehastingscenter.org/pdf/reprogenetics-and-public-policy.pdf.
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I. STATE OF THE ART
A. The Rise of Multiple Births
In 1998, the National Center for Health Statistics reported a dramatic
rise in multiple pregnancies between 1986 and 1996.17 Late last year,
the National Vital Statistics Reports found a continued increase with
triplet births that now accounts for 184 per 100,000 live births.' 8 The
number of these high risk pregnancies has risen nearly 400% since
1980. There are three primary factors that have contributed to the
increase in multiples. The first factor is the trend toward delaying
childbearing, which has led to older maternal age. 19 With advancing
maternal age comes an increased incidence of multiples, mostly twins.
It is estimated that about 20% of the increase in multiple births is
attributable to this factor.E°
The second factor is the use of an infertility treatment referred
to as ovarian stimulation. In this treatment, women are given drugs that
induce ovulation by stimulating the follicles to release mature ova. l
Such drugs are typically followed by artificial insemination with the
husband's sperm or they may be administered in preparation for IVF.22
The technique is used for a variety of indications, including cases
where women are not ovulating or where men have low sperm count or
motility.23 Multifetal pregnancy occurs when multiple ova are released,
become fertilized, and develop after implantation in the uterus. To
control the risk of a multiple pregnancy, several measures have been
suggested including: more stringent controls on drug distribution;
developing stricter clinical guidelines for fertility medications;
restricting distribution to specialists; reducing dosing guidelines; and
even removing many traditional pharmaceutical treatments. 24 However,the fact that hormonal products may offer the only mechanism to
17 Elster, supra note 10, at 617.
'8 Martin, et al., Births: Final Data for 2002, 52(10) NATIONAL VITAL STATISTICS
REPORTS (CDC) 1, 3 (December 17, 2003).
19 Strong, supra note 8, at *1.
20 i.
21 Lars Noah, Assisted Reproduction Technologies and the Pitfalls of Unregulated
Biomedical Innovation, 55 FLA. L. REv. 603, 611 (2003).
22 The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has approved the 3 main pharmaceutical
products for the treatment of infertility: clomiphene citrate (sold under the brand
names of Clomid and Serophene), human menopausal gonadotropins (hMG) (sold
under the brand names of Fertinex and Metrodin), and human chorionic gonadotropin
(hCG) (sold under the brand names Pregnyl and A.P.L.). Id.
23 Strong, supra note 8, at *1.
24 See Noah, supra note 21, at 654-56.
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trigger ovulation for some women and their inconsistent physiological
reaction to these therapeutics makes the risk-benefit calculus of ovarian
stimulation a very unpredictable art.
25
The third factor contributing to multiple births from a single
pregnancy is in vitro fertilization (IVF). In vitro fertilization involves
harvesting oocytes from the patient, extracorporeal fertilization by
mixing them with sperm in a culture media that promotes fertilization,
and then transferring the resulting embryos back into the patient.
26
Generally, preembryos are screened and the most developed are
transferred to the woman. However, because not all transferred
preembryos implant in the woman's uterus, many clinicians operate
under the misguided belief that the probability of live birth may be
increased by transferring multiple preembryos.27 The unfortunate side
effect, which too often results, is a high-risk multifetal pregnancy.
28
When we consider the percentage of live births from assisted
reproductive technology, the magnitude of the problem is illuminated.
In 2002, 36 percent of pregnancies (32 percent twins and 4 percent
triplets) created by ART in the United States resulted in multiple-infant
live births.2 9 These figures indicate a substantial decline from earlier
figures, 30 but the persistence of this phenomenon is troubling
nonetheless. Although ovarian stimulation has proven difficult to
regulate, third-generation technologies such as blastocyst culture and
micromanipulation of gametes can allow us to improve risk assessment
and prevent IVF-born multifetal pregnancies.
31
25 Id., at 656.
26 Noah, supra note 21, at 609.
27 Strong, supra note 8, at *2; see also Helen Pearson, Big Success for Single Embryos
in IVF (October 22, 2004), at http://www.nature.com (The pregnancy rates after
transferring one embryo is not significantly greater than the rate after transferring two
embryos given modem techniques for growing and transplanting healthy blastocysts).
28 In 1996, the live birth rate with three embryos transferred to the uterus was 35.8%
(including 14.6% multiple births), four embryos produced 36.7% (16.2% multiples),
five was 34.4% (15.2% multiples), and six embryos transferred resulted in 36.9%
(17.8% multiples). Dickens, supra note 4, at 58.
29 Nat'l Centers for Chronic Disease Prevention and Health Promotion (CDC), supra
note 3.
30 In 2000, 53% of infants created by ART (44% twins and 9% triplets) were
multifetal pregnancies. See Wright, supra note 9.
31 Noah, supra note 21, at 655.
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B. The Risks of ART To Children
Multiple gestation involves significant medical risks for fetuses and
infants, some of which are potentially serious and enduring.32 Most
medical complications result from the fact that multiples are often born
prematurely. The average gestation period for singletons is 39
weeks. 34 This dramatically decreases with the number of fetuses
carried: 35 weeks for twins, 33 for triplets, and 29 weeks for
quadruplets (just over viability).35 Although only 2% of singletons are
premature births (less than 33 weeks gestational age), 14% of twins and
41% of triplets are born premature.36 This prematurity among multiples
generally contributes to a high incidence of low birth weight.
37
Although only 1% of singletons are born with a birth weight of less
than 1,500 grams, 10% of twins and 32% of triplets are born under this
birth weight.3 8 The problem is only exacerbated in higher-order
quintuplets, sextuplets, and septuplets that have dominated the press of
late.3 9 Low birth weight significantly impacts infant morbidity and
mortality as infants born weighing less than 2,500 grams are forty times
more likely to die in early infancy.4 ° Those that survive have an
increased incidence of serious complications and physical or mental
disabilities including: lung development problems, cranial
hemorrhaging, hyaline membrane disease, bronchopulmonar7
dysplasia, intraventricular hemorrhage, and necrotizing enterocolitis. 41
Children born through a multifetal pregnancy also suffer from a higher
incidence of congenital malformations, the most common being
intersex, anencephaly, hydrocephaly, omphalocele, anal atresia, and
tracheoesophageal fistula.42 As a result of these problems, many
32 Studies in 1996 indicated that 16% of all neonatal deaths were multiples and that
these children were seven times more likely to die within the first year of life.
Another study found a disproportionate number of fetuses suffer from deformational
V3agiocephaly, or abnormal head shape. Elster, supra note 10, at 618.
Strong, supra note 8, at *2.
34 Elster, supra note 10, at 618.
35 Id.
36 Strong, supra note 8, at *2.
37 On average, the birth weight of a triplet is only half that of a singleton; 90% of
triplets and higher-order multiples weigh less than 2,500g compared to only 6% of
singletons. Elster, supra note 10, at 618.
38 Strong, supra note 8, at *2.
39 Id.
40 Elster, supra note 10, at 618.




multiples require treatment and extended care in neonatal intensive care
units (NICU).43
Multiples may also suffer from long-term medical and
developmental problems. The incidence of cerebral palsy increases
from 1.6 per 1,000 in singleton pregnancies to 75.9 per 1,000 in higher-
order (triplet) pregnancies; a forty-seven-fold increase. 44  Other
common maladies include mental retardation, chronic lung disease, and
45retinopathy of prematurity. The problems that can arise from a
multiple pregnancy are illustrated by the following examples. Two of
the sextuplets born in New York in 1996 suffer from serious long-term
medical problems; one child is blind and the other is epileptic. Two of
the McCaughey septuplets have severe reflux and, despite undergoing
esophageal surgery, still have trouble eating.46 Two others have
developmental problems which may result in cerebral palsy.
4 7
Unfortunately, these examples are indicative of the norm in higher-
order births rather than the exception.
In addition, while the perinatal and neonatal mortality rates of
multiple gestation has decreased over the past decade,48 it remains
significantly high. Although the death rate is 8.8 per 1,000 in singleton
births, it is 82.6 per 1,000 in triplets.49
C. The Medical Risks of ART to Women
Multiple gestation also poses long- and short-term medical risks to
women. Preterm labor is the most common maternal complication of a
multifetal pregnancy which often requires treatment with labor-
arresting drugs that have side-effects such as respiratory distress.50
While the incidence of preterm labor is 15% for women with singleton
pregnancies, it is 40%, 75%, and 99%, respectively, for women
carrying twins, triplets, and quadruplets.5' Other frequently occurring
43 While only 15% of singletons are admitted to the NICU, 48% of twins and 78% of
triplet and higher order multiples were admitted. Elster, supra note 10, at 618.
"Strong, supra note 8, at *2.
45 d.
46 Elster, supra note 10, at 618.
47 Id.
48 A positive effect of the use of differential management schemes, such as
prophylactic admission to the hospital, oral tocolysis, intravenous tocolysis, or
cervical cerclage, to prolong the pregnancy and allow thorough fetal and maternal
monitoring. Strauss, et al., Multifetal Gestation- Maternal and Perinatal Outcome of
112 Pregnancies, 17 FETAL DIAGN THER 209, 214 (2002).
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complications include premature delivery, pregnancy-induced
hypertension, toxemia, gestational diabetes, vaginal uterine
hemorrhage, preeclampsia, anemia, and premature rupture of
membranes.5 2 Gestating multiples also expose women to prolonged
bed-rest (to prevent pre-term labor),53 hospitalizations (for hypertension
or bleeding), administration of medication, cerlage, 54 incompetent
cervix, caesarian section, and postpartum hemorrhage." Postpartum
hemorrhage, combined with anemia, leads to the increased need for
blood transfusions in patients with multifetal pregnancies.
6
Despite these numerous physical complications, the adverse
psychological complications are more troubling. Research indicates
that mothers with multiples are more likely to suffer from depression,
abuse drugs and alcohol, and divorce because of the fatigue and stress
57
arising from child care.
D. The Limits of Federal and State Regulation
At present, it seems that ART is bound only by the ethics of the fertility
specialists and the financial and emotional limits of the couples
undergoing the treatment. In the United States, assisted reproductive
technologies proceed virtually unregulated with limited federal and
state intervention. 58 As a result, the market rules and no one in the
contracting process speaks for the future children whose interests have
never been given careful consideration.
59
The fertility field is an extremely competitive multibillion-
dollar industry.6° As such, the profitability of a particular clinic
depends on its success, measured by number of pregnancies and live
births. 6 1 As happens in any unregulated industry, questions arise about
the accuracy of a clinic's promotional claims, particularly with regard
to inflated success rates.6 2 In response to this concern, Congress passed
52 Elster, supra note 10, at 619.
53 Loss of muscle and atrophy is associated with prolonged bed-rest and may result in
the loss of substantial weight. Id.
54 A minor surgical procedure in which the cervix is sewn closed to prevent preterm
dilation. Id.
55 Strong, supra note 8, at *2.
56 
id.
7 Id. at *3.
58 Rosato, supra note 1, at 62.
59 Id. at 63.60 Id. at 73.
61 id.
62 Noah, supra note 21, at 614.
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the Fertility Clinic Success Rate and Certification Act of 1992 and
directed the Center for Disease Control (CDC) to collect and publish
information regarding fertility center success rates. 63 However, this
mandatory reporting requirement serves no regulatory purpose and
clinics continue to maximize pregnancy rates by transferring too many
embryos per cycle.64 Information regarding a clinic's success rates,
originally intended to serve a consumer-oriented purpose, has had the
regrettable side-effect of promoting unethical business practices
because it causes patients, seeking clinics with the highest live birth
rate, to be unwittingly drawn to clinics having the highest rates of
failure or multiple births.
Unfortunately, the Act does not clearly state the consequences
of failure to comply. Under the Act, a failure to report will trigger "the
routine penalty for non-reporting in force at the time of reporting," the
practical consequence of which is simply publication of
noncompliance.
65
State regulation does not offer any greater protections because it
is not comprehensive and varies considerably state-to-state. Most
regulation of assisted reproduction at the state level is focused on
limited aspects of ART such as sperm donation, surrogacy, embryo
donation, and embryo storage and abandonment. 66 Although a few
states have attempted to regulate ART directly, this approach is the
exception, not the rule.67
E. The Limits of Self-Regulation
With limited governmental regulation or legal restrictions, fertility
centers and health professionals are largely self-regulated. Self-
regulation has advantages over legal regulation because it protects
patients' reproductive interests and can respond to issues in a more
flexible and reflexive manner.68 However, though professional medical
organizations regulate some fertility practices, the system is not well-
equipped to curb harmful practices.
The American Society of Reproductive Medicine (ASRM) is
the principal organization that supervises the field of reproductive
medicine. The Society of Assisted Reproductive Technology (SART),
631 Id. at 615.
64 Pinchuk, supra note 13, at 52.
65 Rosato supra note 1, at 64.
66 Id. at 65.
67 Id. at 66.
61 Id. at 67.
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an affiliated organization, specifically covers IVF programs." ASRM
and SART have issued policies on gamete donation, the number of
embryos that can be safely transferred, and gender selection. However,
these policies have proved ineffective for three reasons. First, existing
enforcement mechanisms are not only ill-equipped to detect violations,
but even when violations are detected the corresponding penalties are
so minimal that they have little effect in correcting unethical
practices. 70 The penalty for noncompliance is removal from group
membership, however violators are still free to offer services to
couples.71 Consequently, non-reporters can still build a lucrative
practice without oversight.
Second, many of the standards set forth by SART are too
flexible to be enforceable. 72 Although the Committee Report sets out
guidelines regarding the number of embryos to transfer, it allows
individual programs to redefine, and many times exceed, these
guidelines based on data and variables within specific practices.73 The
most current Committee Report recommends that physicians may
transfer one to five embryos per cycle based on particularized criteria
such as the patient's age, fertility prognosis, and history of failed IVF
cycles.74 However, in practice this discretionary approach has proven
ineffective. Nearly 66% of all ART cycles using fresh ova involved the
transfer of at least 3 embryos, about 28% involved the transfer of four
or more, and 10% involved 5 or more embryos. 75 The transfers
involving 3 or more embryos resulted in 5-6% risk of delivering
triplets.7
Third, and most importantly, limited regulation allows
experimental procedures with unproven efficacy to be adopted too
quickly.77 This "practice first, assess risk later" approach puts families
at risk and places the task of evaluating the safety of techniques in the
hands of those who stand to profit from their use.
69 Rosato, supra note 1, at 66.
70 Id. at 68.
71 Id.
72 Id.
73 Rosato, supra note 1, at 68.
74 See Practice Committee of SART and ASRM, Guidelines on the Number of
Embryos Transferred, 82(3) FERTILITY AND STERILITY 773 (September 2004).
75 Nat'l Centers for Chronic Disease Prevention and Health Promotion (CDC), supra
note 3.
76 Id.
77 Rosato, supra note 1, at 69.
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F. Multifetal Pregnancy Reduction as Multiple Pregnancy
Regulation
The considerable risks inherent in carrying a multiple pregnancy to
term made it necessary to consider how to eliminate, or at least greatly
reduce the incidence of, the multiple gestation associated with assisted
reproductive technologies. There are three options available when the
fertility procedure results in a multifetal pregnancy: (1) terminate the
entire pregnancy through abortion and attempt to conceive again; (2)
accept the situation and hope for a natural resolution of some of the
multiple gestations despite the risks; or (3) employ currently available
techniques for pregnancy reduction. 78 Presented with these limited
options, only the third affords the opportunity of achieving the intended
goal of the fertility treatment with a good outcome.79 Therefore, it is
appropriate to consider pregnancy reduction as an unfortunate, but
sometimes necessary, therapeutic intervention connected with fertility
treatments.
Proponents of multifetal pregnancy reduction (MFPR) cite the
medical justification as the strongest argument in favor of this
procedure. Multifetal reduction is generally performed between the 9 th
and 12 th weeks of gestation and commonly involves the insertion of a
needle guided by ultrasound through the abdominal wall and the
injection of potassium chloride into the thorax of a fetus to stop its
heart.80 Many commentators consider multifetal reduction a "lifeboat"
intervention, i.e. a utilitarian intervention intended to increase the
likelihood of survival of some of the fetuses to birth rather than the loss
or significant pain and suffering of all the fetuses. 81 This focus on intent
is what distinguishes abortion from MFPR: the former is performed to
terminate the entire pregnancy, while the latter is performed to salvage
the pregnancy. The law's definition of abortion as motivated by the
desire to avoid procreation unavoidably excludes the termination of life
with the intent to produce a live birth.
Multifetal reduction also carries less ethical baggafe than
another procedure known as selective reduction (termination). 8 Unlike
78 Rorty, supra note 11, at 60.
79 Id.
80 Elster, supra note 10, at 619.
81 Id.
82 Pinchuk, supra note 13, at 38.
83 Selective termination refers to the procedure in which one or more anomalous
fetus(es) in a multifetal pregnancy are terminated. The affected fetuses usually have
chromosomal, structural, or genetic adnormalities identified by ultrasound
examination or an invasive prenatal diagnostic test, such as amniocentesis or
2005]
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selective reduction, in multifetal reduction the physician chooses
fetus(es) to be terminated based on proximity to the abdominal wall and
terminates as many as are necessary to increase the likelihood of a
positive outcome. 84 Since the fetus(es) are chosen arbitrarily with
respect to genetic characteristics, the procedure is less ethically
controversial 85 and thus accepted by many political entities. 86 As might
be anticipated, the procedure is neither approved nor practiced among
nations where abortion is specifically illegal or socially unacceptable.
A second argument for MFPR is grounded in the iatrogenic
nature of the multiple gestation problem.87 In the two most common
fertility treatments, ovarian stimulation and IVF, multiple fetuses are
not the intended result of the fertility drugs or transfer procedure and
only occur indirectly as a result of third-party intervention. The implicit
responsibility felt by many physicians creates an obligation in many to
fix the problem. Therefore, the physician involved in the fertility
chorionic villus sampling. In contrast to MFPR, the selectively terminated fetus(es) is
chosen based upon a fetal abnormality rather than randomly or based upon its position
in the uterus. Rorty, supra note 11, at 57.
84 In a multichorionic pregnancy, the fetus(es) reduced are those that are most easily
accessible, usually closest to the anterior uterine wall and/or the fundus. The fetus
above the cervix is avoided whenever possible because of the hypothetical increased
risk for infection or uterine irritability if that fetus were reduced. However, if the fetus
has a lagging crown rump length, a significantly smaller sac, increased nuchal
translucency, or an obvious anomaly, then that fetus is preferentially reduced. LG
Keith, et al. Multiple Gestation: Reflections on Epidemiology, Causes, and
Consequences, 45 INT J. FERTIL WOMENS MED 206 (2000).
85 Selective termination differs from MFPR in two important ways. First the choice of
which fetus to reduce is not arbitrary. Therefore, use of selective reduction (and pre-
implantation genetic diagnosis) to select for genetic and phenotypic characteristics
results in serious theological and ethical questions and is thought by many to be the
precursor to "designer genetics." It encourages reductivism or the identification of a
specific child by his selected trait(s). Even if this does not lead society to reduce
individuals to traits, it may subtly encourage us to disassemble persons into nothing
more than the sum of their parts rather than as something greater than the sum. Mary
Crossley, Choice, Conscience, and Context, 47 HASTINGs L.J. 1223, 1232-1233
(1996). Second, the termination is not intended to increase the chances of a live birth,
but rather to prevent the birth of an abnormal child. Thus, selective termination is not
a "lifeboat" decision justified by the principle that it is wrong to bring avoidable
suffering into the world. Rorty, supra note 11, at 65-66.
86 Abortion is illegal or socially unacceptable in only 29% of the 52 surveyed
countries including Ireland and many of the Latin American countries such as
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, El Salvador, and Venezuela. Supplement, Chapter
10: Fetal Reduction, 81(5) FERTILITY & STERILITY S35 (2004).




procedure is: (1) the proximate cause for the fertilization of the pre-
embryos; (2) an intervening agent that disrupts the otherwise "natural"
selection of embryos that have the chance to implant; and (3) directly
co-responsible for the failure which a multifetal pregnancy represents.8 9
The causal context of the multiple pregnancy is an important variant
when analyzing the ethics of MFPR because the physician is the causal
agent of a specific, and often lengthy, chain of inter-related actions
occurring because of his intervention.
90
II: A MISCARRIAGE OF JUSTICE?
The nature of contemporary medical practice is that interventions
that are discovered and perfected in one context are readily
transferable to others. If a specialist develops a high degree of skill
in a procedure, the decision to invoke the skill in a different context
might be: "I can do it. " In the context offetal reduction, however,
the first question ought to be: "Should I do this? "9'
A. Post-Hoc Ethical Analysis
The medical, ethical, and legal literature contains little discussion of the
ethical issues that multifetal pregnancy reduction raises. To the extent
that these concerns are addressed, the ethical gymnastics generally
begins at a point when a multiple pregnancy already exists. In these
cases MFPR is presumed acceptable based on the legality of abortion or
utilitarian ethics.92 However, the fundamental ethical inquiry should
begin not once a high-order multiple pregnancy is established, but
when people choose a course of conduct that creates a substantial risk
of multiple pregnancy. To draw on the "lifeboat" metaphor, the ethical
analysis should begin at the moment the ship's captain decides to sail
the stormy seas since it is at this moment that he predestines his crew to
make grave mortal decisions.93 Similarly, the use of infertility
treatments that induce superovulation or multiple embryo transfer
raises ethical concerns because the treatment course willingly flirts with
the high probability that a multiple pregnancy will result.
The following example illustrates why this willing
entertainment of risk may be troubling. Imagine a couple that
89 Id.
90 Id.
9' Rorty, supra note 11, at 53-54.
92 Crossley, supra note 85, at 1227.
93 Id.
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understands the risks of multiple pregnancy and availability of MFPR,
but nonetheless chooses to pursue an aggressive treatment that
maximizes their chances of giving birth.94 In this scenario, the couple is
willing to deliberately destroy fetal life in order to achieve their goal of
creating a genetically-related child.95  This choice creates a
disproportionate risk of harms to fetal life in order to advance the
couple's personal needs or goals. 96 Even proponents of women's rights
who disagree on the absolute level of harm associated with terminating
a fetus, agree that the context within which this choice is made affects
the proportionality of harm.97 In the context of abortion, the law
permits individuals willing to engage in unprotected sexual intercourse
to the assume the risk that the termination of fetal life may become
necessary to achieve life goals. 98 By comparison, one might rationally
conclude that the assumption of risk in the fertility scenario is less
troubling because it reflects an ardent, and perhaps selfless, desire to
have a child. When faced with a multifetal pregnancy, the physician's
application of the medical frame99 to this moral dilemma may
encourage a selfless and responsible reduction to salvage the
pregnancy.
From the moralist perspective °° however, the consent to engage
in multifetal reduction reveals a grave and inevitable immorality. The
very intent of the couple to create fetal life they are later willing to
destroy adds an additional, symbolic harm. 01 The image of deliberately
creating life only to turn around and destroy it smells of the wickedness
we associate with human cloning and may have a powerful symbolic
94 id.
9' Id. at 1228.
96 Crossley, supra note 85, at 1228.
97 Id.
98 Id.
99 The medical frame focuses its inquiry on the evidence regarding statistical
outcomes. The statistical analysis that forms the basis of the medical frame focuses on
two issues: the risks associated with multigestational pregnancies without reduction,
and the risks associated with reduction to different endings. This reliance on statistical
evidence is commonplace in rational thought and represents a standard way to work
towards a consensus regarding treatment. Britt, et al., Framing the Decision:
Determinants of How Women Considering Multifetal Pregnancy Reduction as a
Pregnancy Management Strategy Frame Their Moral Dilemma, 19 FETAL DIAGN
THER 232, 233 (2004).
100 The moral frame attends to statistical evidence of risk in making medical decisions
but does so within the context within which it occurs. This contextual approach seeks
to minimize the disruption to the moral principles to which one subscribes. Id. at 234.
101 Crossley, supra note 85, at 1228.
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impact. 102 This symbolic harm associated with using human life, albeit
unborn human life, to advance one's own ends must be considered in
balancing the "goal sought against the potential harms wrought."'
10 3
Thus, a prospective parents' decision to use aggressive infertility
treatment to maximize their chance of conceiving a child may even be
seen as more selfish than a postmenopausal woman's decision to bear a
child or a decision to hire a woman to act as a surrogate mother.
104
B. A Focus on Context: Adding to the Ethical Complexity
Many commentators, however, believe that neither the selfish nor the
selfless classification accurately encapsulates a woman's choice when
faced with deciding whether to reduce a multiple pregnancy.'° 5 Buried
behind the polarized rhetoric of the public abortion debate, lies another,
more appropriate, classification. Carol Gilligan's abortion study
provides an appropriate lens through which to view and better
understand multifetal pregnancy reduction.'0 6 The study, conducted in
the immediate aftermath of Roe v. Wade between 1973 and 1975, was
designed to clarify ways in which women of various ages, social class,
and ethnic backgrounds, construct and resolve abortion decisions.' 0 7
Gilligan describes her main findings as follows:
Women were constructing the dilemma in a way that was
completely at odds with the public conversation. Then, as now,
the public discussion of abortion was framed as a conflict
between the right to life and right to choice, raising the question
of whose rights took precedence in a formulation that pitted the
fetus against the mother (according to right-to-lifers) or women
against men (according to pro-choicers). Yet women were
saying, "I'm in this dilemma of relationship and I can't see any
way of acting that will not cause hurt. So I don't know what to
do. There is no good thing to do here. " So I would ask them,
"What are you thinking about? Who is involved?" And they
would say, "Well, everybody affected by the decision is
involved. It was like someone on a trampoline. You make a
move and the whole thing is shaking. " Women said, "it will
affect my parents, it will affect... all these people, and I don 't
102 Noah, supra note 21, at 605.
103 Crossley, supra note 85, at 1229.
104 Id.
105 See generally Pinchuk, supra note 13.
106 Pinchuk, supra note 13, at 39.
'07Id. at 39.
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know how to move without having an effiect on all these people,
and if I don't move, I will have a baby. 8
The abortion study demonstrates that women's abortion
discussions are much more multilayered, complex, and relational than
the public debate of right versus murder. 10 9 Gilligan noted that women
characterized themselves as either selfish or selfless when they spoke
of connection, responsiveness, and responsibility because the
opposition of self and the other was so pervasive and powerfully voiced
in public debate.
10
The analogy to being on a trampoline is equally applicable to
multifetal pregnancy reduction with the addition that nonfeasance could
result in two unique outcomes - conception of multiple babies, or
possibly no babies."11 Further adding to the complexity is the fact that
MFPR not only pits the fetus's interests against those of the mother, but
each fetus's interest is in competition with each other's. 12 Nowhere is
this more evident than in the physical torment endured by women who
have carried multiple fetuses to term. Bobby McCaughey was
described as having had difficulty gaining enough weight for her seven
fetuses; she gained only 25 pounds during her pregnancy despite the
fact that her waist was fifty-two inches." 3 Nkem Chukwu spent the last
two and a half weeks of her pregnancy bed-ridden at an upside down
tilt in order to keep her fetuses in utero for as long as possible. 14 While
being bed-ridden and upside down may seem like the ultimate sacrifice
to bring multiple lives into existence, others view the same act as
selfish because it places a personal desire to reproduce ahead of
bringing healthy infants into the world." 5 Herein lies the tension that so
permeates MFPR and distinguishes it from abortion - while the
abortion study labeled a woman's decision as selfish or selfless, these
characterizations seem to collide in the context of multifetal pregnancy
reduction. " 
6
In the abortion context, it is the patients that fall in the middle
and have difficulty finding a moral compass because they experience
108 Id.
109 Id.
110 Pinchuk, supra note 13, at 45.
I Id. at 40.
12 Id.
"' Id. at 46.





pressure in contradictory directions that are most at risk." 7 In these
patients, the anxiety generated by the moral dilemma has long-term
ripple effects on their birth outcomes and their adjustment following
reduction. 11 8
C. To Reduce or Not to Reduce: A Psychological Tug-of-War
Although there are no comprehensive studies examining the
psychological effects on women who undergo multifetal pregnancy
reduction, an analogy to abortion studies is instructive. Like the
decision to abort, the decision to reduce does not occur in a vacuum but
impacts the woman making it. A 1992 study in the British Medical
Journal indicated that eight years after an abortion women were 138%
more likely to be at high risk for clinical depression than those who
carried their unintended first pregnancy to term. 19 Women who choose
to abort are more likely to experience a sense of loss, guilt, repression,
sleeping disorders, anniversary reactions, problematic relationships
with men, obsessive-compulsive behavior, suicide attempts, and
psychotic conversion reactions.
120
The decision not to abort also affects parents of multiples
socially and psychologically. They are more exhausted, depressed, and
anxious after the birth of their babies. 12 1 Life changes dramatically with
the birth of one baby, one can only imagine life after the simultaneous
birth of three or four children, particularly if they have physical or
cognitive disabilities. Interestingly, Roe recognized the potential
psychological impact of having a possibly unwanted child: "Maternity,
or additional offspring, may force upon the woman a distressful life and
future. Psychological harm may be imminent. Mental and physical
health may be taxed by child care."
'' 22
117 Britt, supra note 99, at 239.
1 8 id.
119 Publication of this study coincided with the 30-year anniversary of Roe v. Wade.
The study was carried out between 1979 and 1992; overall, 4,463 women were
surveyed about depression, intendedness of pregnancy, and pregnancy outcome.
Clinical Abortion after Unintended Pregnancy Linked to Abortion (Jan. 18, 2002),
available at http://www.afterabortion.org/news/depressionbmj.html.
120 Pinchuk, supra note 13, at 47.
121 Elster, supra note 10, at 621.
122 Pinchuk, supra note 13, at 47.
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D. The Cost-Benefit Analysis
Today, healthcare spending accounts for 15% of the nation's
economy. 123 Earlier this year, the Department of Health and Human
Services (DHHS) reported that healthcare spending expanded 9.3% in
2002 to a total of $1.55 trillion. 124 This represents the largest increase
in 11 years. 125 As a percentage of the gross national product, federal
spending on healthcare has tripled in the past two decades and, if the
latest rise is any indication, the problem appears to be getting worse. 126
The necessary care associated with multiple births has a sizeable
impact on healthcare spending. In 1997, surviving quadruplets
purportedly cost the healthcare system $1.2 million 2 7 for maternal and
neonatal care after a premature delivery.' 28 And, even after lengthy
stays in neonatal intensive care units (NICU), many premature infants
leave the hospital only to return with serious physical and
developmental handicaps.' 29 In light of these costs, pregnancy
reduction may seem like the answer to the multiple gestation problem.
When there is a multiple pregnancy, reducing the number of fetuses
improves the chances of a good outcome at a nominal cost. But this
would be a very shortsighted way to view the multiple gestation
problem and is a gross distortion of the notion of preventive care.
There are several reasons why pregnancy reduction is not a
viable solution. First, patient surveys indicate that at least one-third of
infertile couples would not choose fetal reduction on religious or
ethical grounds. 130 Second, fetal reduction is a highly stressful and
psychologically traumatic experience for a woman to bear.' 31 Most of
these women have already dealt with the emotional roller-coaster of
failed pregnancies, unsuccessful IVF cycles, or years of struggle to get





126 An Overview of the U.S. Healthcare System: Two Decades of Change, 1980-2000
(2002), available at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/charts/healthcaresystem/all.asp?
127 Rorty, supra note 11, at 62.
128 A 1997 study found that daily hospital charges exponentially increase from $591
for a singleton to $1,715 for each higher-order infant born (third and above) of a
multiple pregnancy. Delivering a baby before 30 weeks' gestation costs $100,000 and
a 3-month hospital stay for a preterm baby could near $500,000. Elster, supra note 10,
at 620.
129 Noah, supra note 21, at 620.




pregnant. Though unsupported by psychological studies, it is
reasonable to assume that infertile women are particularly vulnerable
and susceptible to depression given their past experiences. These
women finally find themselves in the position of being pregnant only to
face making a decision about whether to abort some of their fetuses.'
32
Finally, multifetal pregnancy reduction is not a fail-safe procedure. The
main complication is loss of the entire pregnancy.1 3 3
The more appropriate remedy is to prevent women from having
to make the decision to reduce in the first place. Instead of attending to
the immediate context of a reduction decision, we need to focus our
attention on the larger social, cultural, moral, and economic context in
which we make reproductive choices. From an economic standpoint,
the transfer of fewer embryos can reduce the probability of multiple
gestation and the healthcare costs from complications associated with
multiple pregnancy. Likewise, the cost of treating psychological effects
and depression that follow a decision to reduce in many women would
be eliminated.
From moral and social perspectives, the use of assisted
reproductive technologies to promote consumer preferences that satisfy
our own selfish desires threatens to erode our sense of humanity and
the non-contingent connection between parent and child. 134 The advent
of reproductive technology has spawned an unparalleled focus on
autonomy that seems to have eroded the notion of pregnancy as a
blessed gift. The view of multifetal pregnancy reduction as a
benevolent intervention to multiple gestation threatens our sense of
personhood 135 by encouraging shortsightedness and selfish behavior
since fetal reduction serves as a remedy for an irresponsible choice to
implant many embryos. Our focus needs to be on encouraging moral
reasoning and conscience searching by the couple, family, clinician,
and all those involved in the process, not on promoting certain
outcomes. 136 While it is important to respect an individual's liberty to
make reproductive decisions, simply exercising the right to choose
reduction as a remedy to the unwanted fetuses that result from
transferring unnecessary embryos does not further the ideal of
1 3 2 
id.
133 The risk of pregnancy loss is based on the number of initial fetuses and the
experience of the healthcare professional. For pregnancies that begin with triplets, the
loss rate for reduction to twin is about 4-8%; by contrast, in a higher-order 6+ fetus
gestation, the loss rate may be as high as 21%. Id.
134 Crossley, supra note 85, at 1234.
1 3 5 
id.
136 Id. at 1238.
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autonomy that strengthens personhood. 137 Instead, the autonomy that
we should value is that which encourages educated, reflective, and
values-based decision making or we may find ourselves in a moral
vacuum where autonomy simply reflects personal choice with no
principle available for moral judgment.1 38 Moreover, although the
decision to reduce may not have the same ethical gravity as abortion,
the potential for psychological trauma following pregnancy reduction
indicates that we may simply be replacing one problem with another.
If we paid more heed to context, we might find more couples
exercising their autonomy to limit the number of embryos transferred
even if this might lower their chances of becoming pregnant.' 39 The
willingness to avoid a higher-order multiple pregnancy reflects a moral
evaluation and should be the basis of future law and policy.
III: A CRY FOR REGULATION
The decision to elect fetal reduction is not a simple one, and neither are
its consequences. The possibility that a woman might carry the dead
fetus(es) for a period of weeks or months, after the injection of
potassium chloride into the heart sac of fetus(es) and until birth of the
remaining child or children, is not a pleasant one. 140 Neither is the
thought of a one-year old fed formula by a feeding tube and facing an
uncertain future because she was born through a multiple pregnancy.141
These stark realities distinguish multiple gestation and pregnancy
reduction from abortion.142 It raises our discomfort with this discussion
and makes us question whether there is an ethical compromise.
What is clear, despite one's personal constitution regarding its
ethics, is that multifetal pregnancy reduction must remain lawful. It
would be inherently inconsistent to prohibit the practice of multifetal
pregnancy reduction at the 12th week simply because of inherent
conflicts and a potential for adverse psychological consequences when
abortion is lawful until the 27 h or 28 th week (viability) and carries the
same risks. The fact that multifetal pregnancy reduction is intended to
salvage pregnancy, further tips the scales in favor of the lawfulness of
137 id.
138 Richard A. McCormick, Bioethics A Moral Vacuum?, 180(15) AMERICA 8, 8 (May
1, 1999).
139 Crossley, supra note 85, at 1236.
140 Pinchuk, supra note 13, at 52.
141 Id.
142 Id. at 53.
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this "lifeboat" intervention. Therefore, regulation must challenge the
boundaries of procreational autonomy, a liberty interest protected by
the Constitution.143 A woman's personal desire for a multifetal
pregnancy' 44 using assisted reproductive technologies should not trump
the State's interest in protecting these "at risk" children when
alternatives, such as adoption, hosting a child, sponsorship, or even
gestational surrogacy exist to allow couples to parent many children.
Legislation should set an upper limit on transferable embryos in
order to prevent the complications associated with multifetal
pregnancies, protect "at risk" multiples, and preempt the litany of
psychological consequences that may arise from a decision to
reduce. 14 The federal government, in its capacity as parens patriae,
could propose a law limiting the number of preembryos transferred per
cycle. In addition, to ensure compliance with the regulations, an
independent agency resembling the United Kingdom's Human
Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (HFEA) could be established
to license fertility clinics to oversee and validate individual clinical and
laboratory practices. 146 This agency could ensure that only those clinics
and physicians that abide by federal standards and Codes of Practice,
i.e. improved informed consent measures, perform infertility
treatments. To assure that the public interest is adequately represented,
the licensing committee should include ethicists, theologians,
philosophers, lawyers, individuals who have personally experienced
infertility problems, as well as, physicians and scientists. 147 For such a
body to have moral authority it must represent a wide range of
perspectives and be as insulated and independent as possible from the
undue influence of election politics and consumer or business
advocates. 1
48
143 See generally Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
144 Studies indicate that patients with fertility problems express a considerable desire
for multiple births as long as multiple conceptions do not exceed triplets in
number... they are also willing to accept a minor risk to themselves and their
offspring. Gleicher et al., The Desire for Multiple Births in Couples with Infertility
Problems Contradicts Present Practice Patterns, 10(5) HUM REPROD. 1079, 1082-83
(1995).
145 See Pinchuk, supra note 13; see also Strong, supra note 8; see also Noah, supra
note 21.
146 Strong, supra note 8, at *8.
147 See Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority, HFEA Annual Report
2003/04: Facing Up to the Challenge, (2004).
148 The idea of a licensing authority to improve safety, efficiency, and accountability
in reproductive medicine has found some support in the provider-consumer
community. In a 1996 editorial in Fertility and Sterility, Jones Institute of
2005]
DEPAUL JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW
A. Malpractice is an Ineffective Regulatory Mechanism
Given the limits of existing regulations, tort law has emerged as the
primary mechanism for curbing the irresponsible use of assisted
reproductive technologies. Unfortunately, the literature contains little
sophisticated discussion regarding the potential utility of this regulatory
mechanism. 49 Research reveals that only a handful of malpractice
actions have arisen out of fertility treatments. 150 Most of these
malpractice claims allege negligence by the physician for failing to
adequately inform patients of the potential for multifetal pregnancy
when prescribing pharmaceutical products that induce superovulation.
Interestingly however, only a few of these cases involved lawsuits
against the drug manufacturer.' 51 Although physicians have a duty to
warn patients of the potential risks and complications associated with
treatment methods and medications, is it not the duty of pharmaceutical
companies to assure that their medications limit the potential for
adverse side-effects? The threat of tort liability was anticipated to
operate like the threat of sanctions for violations of regulatory edicts. 1
52
But it has done so in a clumsy fashion, disregarding the appropriate
reach of litigation on activities and practice it seeks to regulate.153 Thus
far, tort litigation has only had success resolving claims that perhaps
should have been directed elsewhere.
Moreover, self-interest may underlie the intentions of those that
find sufficient protection of reproductive autonomy in tort litigation,
specifically wrongful birth claims, but oppose closer regulation. 1 4 Tort
litigation must not become a refuge for those who regret reproductive
choices that reflect an over-pursuit of liberty without foresight of
Reproductive Medicine founder, Howard Jones, endorsed recommendations by the
now-defunct National Advisory Board on Ethics in Reproduction (NABER) to license
fertility centers. It was also supported by ASRM, SART, and RESOLVE, a consumer
advocacy group. See Parens and Knowles, supra note 16.
149 Noah, supra note 21, at 633.
150 See Provenzano v. Integrated Genetics, 287 A.D.2d 541 (2001) (where the Court
refused a motion for summary judgment after the defendants failed to detect
chromosomal defects during an amniocentesis that would have led plaintiffs to
selectively reduce one of their twins); Noah, supra note 21, at 635 (In Morgan v.
Christman the defendants failure to disclose the risk of multifetal pregnancy from
Clomid resulted in quadruplets born with disabilities and led to a $2.1 million
settlement).
151 Noah, supra note 21, at 635.





potential consequences or consideration of the attended ethical
responsibilities.] 5 Furthermore, while wrongful birth claims may
"make whole" the void left in an injured party, it leaves fewer resources
to be spread amongst the rest of society given the collective nature of
healthcare dollars.
B. Strict Limitation Does Not Significantly Impede
Clinical Discretion
Current SART and ASRM guidelines allow treatment plans to be
individualized after careful consideration of each patient's unique
circumstances.1 56 The patient and clinic factors that influence the
number of embryos transferred include: patient age, a history of failed
cycles, embryo quality, the opportunity for cryopreservation, and a
clinic's experience with newer techniques. 57 While noble in concept,
any guideline that does not contain a strict limitation on the number of
embryos that may be transferred is incompatible with the goal of
eliminating multiple gestation and the consequent fetal reduction.
Instead, their guidelines permit, in "extraordinary circumstances" the
transfer of nonspecific "additional embryos" based upon individual
particularized circumstances. 158 This increases the risk of a multiple
pregnancy and its associated complications.
155 Id., supra note 21, at 634.
156 See The Practice Committee of SART and ASRM, Guidelines on the Number of
Embryos Transferred, 82(3) FERTILITY AND STERILITY 773 (September 2004).
157 In the absence of data generated by an individual fertility program, the following
guidelines are recommended:
A) In patients under the age of 35, no more than 2 embryos should be
transferred in the absence of extraordinary circumstances. For patients
with the most favorable prognosis, consideration should be given to
transferring only a single embryo. Patients having the most favorable
prognosis include those undergoing their first IVF cycle, have good
quality embryos as judged by morphologic criteria, and have excess of
embryos of sufficient quality to warrant cryopreservation...
B) For patients between 35 and 37 years of age having a more favorable
prognosis, no more than 2 embryos should be transferred. All others in
this age group should have no more than 3 embryos transferred. "
C) For patients between 38 and 40 years of age, no more than 4 embryos
should be transferred...
D) For most patients greater than 40 years of age, no more than 5 embryos
should be transferred.
E) For patients with two or more failed IVF cycles and have less favorable
prognosis, additional embryos may be transferred according to
individual circumstances after appropriate consultation. Id.
158 Id.
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Although physician discretion is important to assure that
treatment is tailored to the individual needs of patients, it cannot occur
unbridled by structure when tort litigation has proven an ineffective
weapon against its abuse. Federal legislation providing a cap on the
number of embryos transferred would neither interfere with a
physician's discretion, provided the recommended course of treatment
remained within the parameters set by law, nor would it impede the
development of new techniques.
Although the potential for politicization 59 always exists with
external regulation, self-regulation is particularly inappropriate in a
highly controversial and ethically-charged fertility industry powered by
the twin engines of desire: an infertile couple's shortsighted desire for
genetically related children and a provider's desire for prestige.' 60 This
leaves society particularly vulnerable to "at risk" multiples and
potential downstream psychological consequences that result from
decisions to reduce. The conflict of interest that arises when an industry
must regulate away from profitability leaves independent federal
regulation as the best alternative. The future of assisted reproductive
technology is "too important to be decided solely by the market."'
' 6 1
C. Federal Legislation Limiting Embryo Transfer Withstands
Constitutional Objections
The Supreme Court recognized the right to procreate as a liberty
interest protected by the United States Constitution. 162 The Court has
defined this liberty interest broadly: "At the heart of liberty is the right
to define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe,
and of the mystery of life. Beliefs about these matters could not define
the attributes of personhood were they formed under compulsion of the
State."'163 Therefore, any restriction on the availability of ART would
undoubtedly trigger constitutional objections. However, this liberty
interest is not absolute. Courts have allowed States to interfere in a
couple's decisions if the State possesses a compelling interest and uses
means necessary and narrowly-tailored to further that interest. 164 Under
159 With external regulation there always exists the potential for political
conservatives to use the government regulatory process to place severe restrictions on
the industry through licensing proceedings. Strong, supra note 8, at *7.
160 Crossley, supra note 85, at 1230.
161 See Parens and Knowles, supra note 16.
162 See generally Planned Parenthood, 505 U.S. 833.
163 Rosato, supra note 1, at 96.
164 See e.g., Planned Parenthood, 505 U.S. 833.
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this standard, the Constitution would tolerate limited regulation of
assisted reproductive technologies.
A bright-line limitation establishing maximum transferable
embryos by federal legislation is likely to be adamantly opposed by
patients and physicians alike. Patients will argue that their right to
procreational autonomy has been infringed. 165 Doctors will likely assert
that such a limitation is too restrictive and prevents them from making
informed medical determinations based on the unique circumstances of
each case and, more generally, that lawmakers do not have the
expertise to legislate medicine. 166 However, these objections are based
on an outdated theory that the probability of pregnancy increases as
greater numbers of embryos are transferred to the uterus. Experts at the
ASRM recently reported that the pregnancy rates after transferring one
embryo is not significantly different than the rate after transplanting
two, given modem techniques for growing and selecting healthy
embryos. 167 In Sweden, the transfer of more than one embryo was
recently banned except in extraordinary circumstances. Nevertheless,
the rate of pregnancy (33%) has remained constant since passage of the
legislation while the frequency of twin pregnancies fell from 23% to
6%.168 Likewise, the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority
(HFEA) in Great Britain reported that the transfer of three preembryos,
as opposed to two, did not improve the birth rate but increased the rate
of multiples by 4% to 11%.169 Both these countries have ART live-birth
rates that exceed the 31% rate 170 of the United States where the number
of embryos transferred is largely unregulated. 171 The success of an IVF
cycle is determined not by the number of embryos, transferred but by
the morphologic characteristics and favorable implantation prognoses
of these embryos. Thus challenges' 72 to federal limits on the number of
embryos that can be implanted would lack merit.
165 Id. at 87.
166 Id.
167 See Pearson, supra note 27.
168 Two studies from US fertility clinics mirrored the Swedish results. Id.
169 Strong, supra note 8, at *5.
170 See Wright, supra note 9.
171 In 2002, 71% of transfers involved three or more embryos. IVF League Tables
Encourage Bad Practice. NEW SCIENTIST. (July 2002).
172 A woman is going to the High Court to challenge Great Britain's three-embryo
transfer limitation (IVF) claiming it is destroying her chances of having a baby. She
has undergone treatment for four years at a cost of 13,000 pounds. Legal Fight Over
IVF Embryos (November 2004), available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/health/955002.stm.
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Moreover, constitutional arguments that have been advanced in
the area of procreational autonomy harken back to a bygone era of
expansive liberalism.1 73 The well-established right to avoid procreation
by choosing among safe and effective methods of contraception and
abortion does not necessarily translate into a right to procreate by any
means one may desire. 174 While the right of self-determination allows
patients to refuse a course of treatment, it does not empower patients to
compel physicians to prescribe treatments that are fruitless or
inappropriate. 75 A patient's right to direct the course of her treatment
is bound by what is therapeutically beneficial. In this case, evidence
that increasing the number of embryos only improves the probability of
a multifetal pregnancy and resulting complications is hardly a
beneficial result.
Further undercutting the argument that strict limitations on ART
impede a person's autonomy is the fact that primarily white women can
afford the $10,000 per cycle cost of ART. In 2002, 184 per 100,000
live births were higher order multiples; however, a healthcare disparity
in ART utilization is evident by the fact that whites accounted for 206
per 100,000 births of higher order multiples while blacks reported only
102.6 per 100,000.176 In the past thirty years the overall rise in the
triplet and other higher order multiple birth ratio (or triplet birth ratio)
can be attributed almost exclusively to the rise in triplet births in white
mothers. 177 The right to procreate is strongest when it involves
invasions of bodily integrity; however, interfering in the private
decision making of an affluent minority population has not been
traditionally protected. 178 The Court has never directly addressed the
extent to which this right protects the freedom of a couple to pursue any
technological means of reproduction they choose. 179 Thus, while a
woman's right to obtain a pregnancy reduction is grounded in a concern
that State interference would deny her the opportunity of a healthy
pregnancy, ART decisions that are generally made well before the
preembryo is implanted in the woman's uterus can not be assumed to
have the same degree of protection.
173 Noah, supra note 21, at 663.
174 id.
175 See Miles, Informed Demand for "Non-Beneficial" Medical Treatment, 325 NEJM
514 (1991).
176 Martin, et al., Births: Final Data for 2002, 52(10) NATIONAL VITAL STATISTICS
REPORTS (CDC) 1, 98 (December 17, 2003).
177 See Id.




In short, constitutional regard for reproductive liberties should
not stand as an obstacle to a strict limitation on transferable embryos
since any benefit that may accompany unchecked discretion is
mitigated by the serious health risks to mothers and children that ART
presents.
D. Insurance Reform Provides Some Relief if Federal
Legislation is Found Unconstitutional
In the event that courts find that procreational autonomy can be
extended to assisted reproductive technologies and the government
cannot meet strict scrutiny, better insurance coverage may solve the
multiple pregnancy problem. Insurance status has been shown to affect
the number of embryos transferred and the risk of high-order multiple
gestation. Generally, insurers have been reluctant to provide
coverage for infertility because fertility treatments are not medically
necessary to preserve a patient's health, and insurers consider ART to
be experimental and infertility to be a preexisting condition.
181
However, in Bragdon v. Abbott, the Supreme Court held that
reproduction is a "major life activity" and that a substantial limitation
on a person's ability to reproduce meets the definition of disability
under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).' 82 While the
ramifications of this decision remain to be seen, it has been
hypothesized that insurers will no longer be able to discriminate against
infertile patients.' 
83
In short, insurance coverage of ART may abate the economic
pressure to complete a family in a single IVF attempt. Also, insurance
coverage of IVF would address a growing healthcare disparity in ART
by increasing minority participation in reproductive technologies from
which they have been historically disenfranchised.
'80 A recent study from SART and the CDC found a modest reduction in the
proportion of high-order embryo transfers in Massachusetts and Rhode Island
(insured states) than in three noninsured states (Indiana, Michigan, and New Jersey)
among women 35 years of age and younger. William Schlaff, Impact of Insurance
Coverage on In Vitro Fertilization Practice Patterns: A Complex Relationship, 80(1)
FERTILITY AND STERILITY 30, 30 (July 2003).
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CONCLUSION
The objective of this Article is not to make a case that multifetal
pregnancy reduction should be banned. Undoubtedly, there is bound to
be some utility for this technique even if presently unforeseeable.
However, the availability of multifetal pregnancy reduction should not
be used as a justification for creating a significant likelihood of high-
order multiple gestation through multiple embryo implantation. The
procreational autonomy bestowed by the Constitution cannot be
extended to permit the unbridled, willful creation and destruction of
fetuses. Autonomy does not grant society a license to absolute freedom
from intervention in all matters regarding our reproductive capacity.
Lines need to be drawn to prevent advancing technology from
destroying the boundaries of ethics and morality. Thus far, the
government, however unwillingly, has refused to entertain this debate.
Assisted reproductive technologies, like other medical
technologies, do not exist in a vacuum. The potential economic and
social harms that may result from irresponsible practice extend beyond
the ART participants. Since Roe, the fertility industry has advanced
bound only by the limits of the participants' ambition, and countless
children born with debilitating injuries have been left in its wake. Thus
far, reactive tort litigation and self-regulation have done little to curb
industry practice. In an era where government silence equals
acquiescence and where unregulated technology threatens to devalue
humanity, political stalemate is not a valid excuse. Proactive federal
oversight is central to cure the problems created over the past twenty-
five years by the lack of regulation over ART.
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